The first 911 call took place at 10:29am from a resident of Piedra Morada Drive, Pacific Palisades. In the strong winds, I could see fire in the distance, and flames flickered over the ridge suffocated by Chaparral.
About 11 minutes later, Engine 23 from the Los Angeles Fire Station radioed to the dispatch.
“We’re on Palisade Drive. We’ve passed Piedra Morada. We’re still heading to where the fire is showing.”
Firefighters spray water on burning homes on Malibu’s Pacific Coast Highway.
(Wally Skalij/Los Angeles Times)
According to LAFD Incident Logs obtained by The Times, it takes more than 18 minutes before Engine 23 or other firefighters reach the scene the morning of January 7th.
Travel time was particularly important as LAFD officials decided not to deploy the engines and firefighters in advance to the Palisades, as they had done in the past.
In online alerts, the National Weather Service highlights Pallisade, San Fernando Valley and Hollywood as one of the areas of “biggest concerns” of anticipated storms and the extraordinary fire hazards it brings I was doing it.
Firefighters will attempt to issue parts of the Pacific Palisade fire that threatens a building near Sunset Boulevard on January 7th.
(Genaro Molina / Los Angeles Times)
The LAFD may have sent at least 10 additional engines to the Palisade prior to the fire. This is what Engine, which may have been on patrol along the hillside and the canyon, told The Times.
The crew of these engines may have discovered the fire as soon as it began.
Instead, according to public information, the crew closest to the fire was based at stations 23 and 69 on Sunset Boulevard, about 3-4 miles from the Piedramorada address on the street map.
By the time the engines from the station reached the area of fire, the flames finally began an unstoppable march, eventually destroying 7,000 homes and other structures, killing at least 12.
LAFD chief Christine Crowley did not respond to requests for an interview for the story. More than a month after the fire, she said that the exact location of the engine or the engine before the flame that the engine first responded, and, as the helicopter began to drop water on the flame, among other queries, I haven’t answered a question from.
Mayor Karen Bass’s office has also not responded to Times’ requests to release records that the city documents LAFD’s actions during the early stages of the fire.
The Sunset Boulevard building is threatened by the Palisade fire on January 7th.
(Genaro Molina / Los Angeles Times)
A total of 18 firefighters are typically working at Stations 23 and 69 to respond to emergencies. Several former LAFD chiefs told the Times. The other four are assigned to ambulances at two stations, but could be useful for evacuation and rescue during a fire.
Palisades fire tolls may not have been that bad, even if additional engines had pre-located in areas that are most likely to be fired from the two Palisades stations, the former chief said.
They also said LAFD officials pre-deployed the city-wide engine on January 7th, rather than in response to previous wind warnings, including 2011, 2013 and 2019.
It was a winter with awful wind predictions and little rain, and I didn’t know exactly where the fire would break out. However, according to the former chief, the Palisades region meets the criteria for a major pre-deployment deployment, as its stations face longer response times to brushes.
Fire Tookes Line Pacific Coast Highway in Malibu on January 8th to provide structural protection for the beachfront home.
(Brian van der Bragg/Los Angeles Times)
They said if there were engines patrol along the hill, the commander could have directed firefighters to monitor the area where the fire finally broke out. Six days ago, on New Year’s Day, a small flame had gone out there, but it may have left an ember hidden in the undergrowth, the former chief said.
LAFD and the Federal Alcohol Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, cigarettes, firearms and explosives are investigating whether a “relapse” from such embers caused the January 7th fire.
Former LAFD ASST. Currently Chief of the Redondo Beach Fire Station, Chief Patrick Butler said Chaparral could burn underground without visible flames for weeks after the original fire was defeated. He said he must deal with invisible ember flare-ups for about a week of the 2019 Getty Fire.
Former LAFD ASST. Chief Patrick Butler, currently the chief of the Redondo Beach Fire Station. He oversaw preparations for the LAFD’s numerous high altitude events and allocated additional engines to easily fired engines.
(Los Angeles Fire Station)
Rekindles is a “very common phenomenon,” said Butler, who left LAFD in 2021 30 years later, during which he spent three years overseeing arson investigations and other special operations.
After the major fire, most of the surrounding vegetation is already burning, Butler said. But after a small fire like January 1st, he said, “Like strong winds, re-flames can easily grow under the right conditions.”
Butler and several other former officials said fires are always more difficult to fight in strong winds, but the engine before deployment means that crews should keep the flame aside and keep it “slim”. He said that it can be done. From the helicopter, if available, the head of the flame is safe to distance from a safe distance.
Other deployed engines could protect the home on roads right next to the fire, they said.
Instead, the crew of Engine 23 and Station 69 were mostly unique in their initial ground response to the fire, according to dispatch records, radio transmissions and interviews. The engines at Brentwood and Venice’s LAFD stations also responded, but the communication shows that that wasn’t enough.
Without strategically placed reinforcements, a small number of engines had little chance of implementing LAFD’s strategy for brush fires.
Chula Vista firefighters are keeping an eye on the Palisade flames after Lynn fell in Mandeville Canyon in Brentwood on January 11th.
(Genaro Molina / Los Angeles Times)
Firefighters said they were “at a strategic disadvantage from the first play” as the LAFD command failed to provide more engines. The US Capitol. “The firefighters did an outstanding job because they were picked up. … They didn’t have time to adopt their usual tactics.”
Perry Vermilion, who retired from the Los Angeles County Fire Department 33 years later as captain, agreed.
“I hit it hard at first and it was over,” said Vermilion, who fought a large number of flames in the Malibu area near Palisade.
According to Vermillion, the LAFD will need to phase in engines at several points in the Pallisard, continuing to run them before the storm hits.
“You’re driving,” he said. “You run up the hills and learn about the area. You’re on patrol. You send some strike teams here and there and hang out in the park. You move them all to all different locations and they Make sure it’s near the brush.”
Shortly after the fire, Crowley denounced the backlog of the engine of budget cuts and fraudulent repairs in defending her department’s decision not to order a massive deployment. However, The Times reports that the department has enough work engines to send numerous extra rigs to Pallisard and elsewhere.
Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass, left, Los Angeles Fire Chief Christine Crowley, right, Los Angeles Police Chief Jim McDonnell (rear) will address the media at a January 11 press conference.
(Allen J. Scheven/Los Angeles Times)
Crowley and her staff have not answered Times’ questions about which engines are inoperable on the day of the fire, or what kind of repairs they need.
LAFD Vice Chief Richard Fields was in charge of preparing for a life-threatening wind storm, but the engines were deployed in advance early in the morning of January 7th (none of which were sent to Pallisard). He told the Times that it was enough. The previous day, authorities decided to deploy nine engines in Hollywood and San Fernando Valley. They said they added more to cover Northeast LA on the morning of Jan. 7, but certain numbers and times were unknown from interviews with officials.
Jason Hin, the Chief Deputy Director of the Emergency Business, admitted that pre-deployment engines were not enough, but insisted that such a fierce fire would not make a difference.
According to incident logs obtained by The Times, nine pre-deployed engines were eventually dispatched to the Palisades fire by midday. By then, the flame had already taken the house.
The Palisade Fire spreads through Mandeville Canyon towards Encino on January 10th.
(Jason Armand/Los Angeles Times)
The department also decided not to order about 1,000 firefighters to finish their shifts early on January 7th, and to continue working to perform staff spare engines and other tasks. The Times reported. By commanding this extra staffing and pulling other engines from the city’s stations, LAFD has at least 10 in each of the five wild corridors in the city, including Palisades, which are at risk of fire. The former chief said he was able to send the rig.
Without such backups, one or both engines of Engine 23 and Station 69 would have cut work for them.
Once the engine 23 passed through the Piedra Morada, the crew was asked to assess the threat to the home. They were told there were 20 additional engines in the middle.
“Once you get there, tell us what we look like if it immediately impacts the structure and immediately affects what you need,” the voice said.
The helicopter first made it and investigated the situation from above.
Firefighters fight the Palisades flames on January 8th as the homes burn along Malibu’s Pacific Coast Highway.
(Wally Skalij/Los Angeles Times)
“It’s pushing directly towards the Palisade,” someone said on the radio from the sky. “This could be 200 acres in the next 20 minutes. There’s probably time to affect the threatened structure within 20 minutes.”
The firefighters on the ground then put pressure on their weight. “Come all the businesses.”
The crew reported that they had burned half-mile to three-quarters of a simmering ember before the main flame. Within an hour of the first 911 call, the house began to burn.
Losing his home in the flames, Terry Fern had hoped that firefighters would be on the hill in advance given the predictions of the harsh winds that burned the same area and the New Year’s brush fire.
“The staging equipment there would have been huge,” he said.
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